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A bstract. In this paper we report on the performance of the RSA vari­
ants of Brands protocols for zero-knowledge proof and restrictive blinded 
issuing [1]. The performance is relatively bad: For 4 a ttribu tes and an 
RSA key size of 1280 bits, blinded issuing takes about 10 seconds and 
the zero-knowledge proof takes about 9 seconds. For 2 a ttribu tes the 
zero-knowledge proof drops to  5 seconds. The poor performance comes 
from the fact th a t the cryptographic coprocessor on the Java card can 
only be employed in very lim ited ways. W ith  appropriate support of the 
cryptographic coprocessor bo th  protocols would run much faster.
Key words: Java Card • selective disclosure • blinded issuing • perfor­
mance
1 In trodu ction
This paper has a (partly) negative message: it shows tha t certain desirable things 
cannot be done, . . .  currently. In particular, it shows, via various performance 
measurements, tha t the current generation of Java cards is unsuitable for ad­
vanced cryptographic protocols, such as privacy-friendly selective disclosure of 
attributes, via zero-knowledge proofs. The simple reason is th a t current cards 
are too slow. The more subtle reason is tha t the Java-Card API does not permit 
access to the (fast!) cryptographic primitive operations on the cryptographic co­
processor. The hope th a t a clear exposition of this problem will contribute to a 
solution in the near future is an im portant motivation for writing this paper.
The emergence of severe vulnerabilities in the Mifare Classic chip card [4,11, 
5], which is heavily used in public transport (like London’s Oyster, or the Dutch 
OV-chipkaart), has led to renewed interest in sm art cards for public transport. 
The current generation of cards is identity-based:
— cards have a fixed UID in anti-collision tha t allows tracing of individuals, 
also outside the context of public transport, since this UID can be picked up 
by any reader;
* Sponsored by the NLnet foundation through the OV-chipkaart project.
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— cards have a fixed (application level) identity tha t is used in every trans­
action, enabling detailed travel logging and profiling of individuals (with a 
personalized card).
There is a desire, at least in certain communities, to move to more privacy- 
friendly mechanisms, based for instance on attributes instead of identities. After 
all, in most cases there is no compelling reason why you should tell who you are 
upon entering a bus; possession of a valid travel attribute should be sufficient. 
Advanced cryptographic protocols have been developed for such attribute-based 
access control, such as [1] based on zero-knowledge and blind signatures or [13] 
based on bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. In this paper we evaluate the ap­
proach of Stefan Brands [1] via a prototype implementation on Java Card. We 
focus on two of the crucial protocols, namely for selective disclosure of attributes 
and for blinded issuing of a signed attribute expression on currently publicly 
available Java cards. This is part of a project th a t is informally called “OV-chip 
2.0”. As Brands suggested, we combine the RSA variants of his proof of knowl­
edge protocol with his protocol for blinded issuing. We equip the protocols with 
the necessary code for initialization and key generation and implement every­
thing in a Java-Card applet and an appropriate host-driver application. The host 
driver runs on a normal PC and talks to a Java card through a CCID compli­
ant sm art-card reader. The host driver can install the applet, download the key 
material and personalize the applet, run the protocols, and, of course, measure 
their execution time.
We actually implemented two versions of the applet. The first one, the 
coprocessor-enabled applet, performs the computations as far as possible on the 
cryptographic coprocessor of the Java card. The second one, the pure Java-C ard  
applet, computes everything on the virtual machine of the Java card. The host 
driver can talk to both applets.
The pure Java-Card applet is, of course, very very slow. It is only discussed 
here to  provide an impression about the speedup of the cryptographic coproces­
sor. However, also the coprocessor-enabled applet is not as fast as we wished. 
For 4 attributes and an RSA key size of 1280 bits, blinded issuing takes about 10 
seconds and the zero-knowledge proof takes about 9 seconds on the coprocessor- 
enabled applet. When using only 2 attributes the zero-knowledge proof takes 
about 5 seconds. The main performance limitation is the Java-Card API (to­
gether with the provided security of Java cards) tha t permits no adequate access 
to the cryptographic coprocessor. We analyze the problems th a t lead to this 
unexpectedly bad performance in more detail in Section 2 and Section 3.
To achieve better performance for Brands protocols one needs access to the 
native (assembly) methods for standard and modular multiplication, modular 
exponentiation and for division tha t fully exploit the cryptographic coprocessor 
on the card. For using elliptic curves with the discrete log (DL) variants of Brands 
protocol one would need access to native methods for point addition and scalar 
point multiplication. Even the current Java Card 3.0 draft does not specify any of 
these methods although any card with support for RSA and elliptic curves does
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contain such methods. W ith adequate access to the cryptographic coprocessor 
Brands protocols would probably run in about 1 second.
Our implementation is based on the Bignat library, a newly developed library 
for big natural numbers on Java Card. The implementation further exploits the 
Java-Card protocol layer for the communication between the applet and the 
host driver. The Java-Card protocol layer is a custom layer for remote method 
invocation on Java cards tha t supports methods with an arbitrary number of 
arguments and results of up to 32 KByte in size. The complete sources are 
available for download from h t tp s  : / /o v c h ip . c s .ru .n l/O V -c h ip _ 2 .0  with one 
exception: Because of Brands patents on his protocols the few methods tha t 
implement the protocol for the two applets and the host driver are missing 
from the distribution.1 The protocol is however fully described in [1] and in 
Appendix B of this paper so tha t it should be not too difficult to get the applets 
running for research purposes.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives insight into the Java-Card 
API and explains why currently any implementation of Brands protocols on Java 
cards will have to fight with performance problems. Section 3 presents our Big­
nat library for operations on big integers on Java Card. Section 4 describes the 
protocols tha t we implemented and presents our performance measurements. In 
Section 5 we shortly discuss elliptic curves and Section 6 concludes. Appendix A 
shortly introduces Montgomery multiplication, because it is mentioned very of­
ten in this paper. The Appendix B contains the technical description of the 
implemented protocols, similar to the descriptions in [1] but with adoptions for 
our implementation.
2 Perform ance L im itation  in th e  Java-C ard A P I
The performance critical part in the RSA variants of Brands protocols are ex­
pressions of the form (g^1 • • • gfcfc ) mod n, which we call m odular m ulti-pow ers in 
the sequel. Such a modular multi-power encodes the attributes a 1, . . .  ,a n of the 
card as numbers and its blinding in a blinded attribute expression. The length of 
the bases, exponents and the modulus determine the security level. A modulus n  
and bases 6j of 1280 bits and exponents a¿ of 160 bits provide reasonable security 
over the next few years.
Apart from the modular multi-powers one also needs multiplication, modular 
multiplication, addition, division and modulus on big natural numbers. Current 
Java cards are equipped with a cryptographic coprocessor and a suitable na­
tive (assembly) library tha t can perform these operations in a reasonably fast 
way. For instance, RSA public key encryption takes only 120 milliseconds for 
a RSA key and a cipher text of 1280 bits and a public exponent of 200 bits. 
This leads to speculated 0.3 milliseconds for one modular multiplication of 1280 
bit numbers. However, Java-Card applets can only use the public Java-Card 
API [8, 9] and extending this API with new native (assembly) methods is not
1 The current paten t owner is Microsoft. Microsoft lawyers are still pondering our 
request from January 2009 to  perm it the d istribution of the complete sources.
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permitted. The current Java-Card API version 2.2.2 [9] gives very limited access 
to the cryptographic coprocessor in class BigNumber in the optional package 
javacardx .fram ew ork .m ath . This class contains multiplication and addition, 
but no modular multiplication, no division or even modular exponentiation. It 
appears th a t almost no cards are available tha t implement version 2.2.2 of the 
Java-Card API. Until now we only found two such cards: The Athena IDPro- 
tect2 and a recent JCOP31 card from NXP. Both do not support the optional 
package javacardx .fram ew ork .m ath . The older API version 2.2.1 [8], which is 
implemented by most of the currently available cards, does neither contain the 
package javacardx .fram ew ork .m ath  nor the BigNumber class.
W ithout direct access to the cryptographic coprocessor the only remaining 
possibility is to trick one of the high-level cryptographic methods into perform­
ing, for instance, a modular multiplication or a modular exponentiation. Current 
Java cards provide a number of such high-level methods tha t perform big-integer 
calculations internally, for instance for RSA (encryption, decryption and key 
generation), Diffie-Hellman key exchange and DSA. However, internally most of 
these high-level methods use random padding or randomly generated arguments, 
which cannot be controlled from the API level. These random ingredients are 
essential for the security of those methods, but they make it impossible to turn  
them  into a big-integer operation.
We only found one exception: The ALG_RSA_NOPAD cipher algorithm contains 
no random padding and can be used to compute a modular power ga mod n. 
There are some restrictions on the arguments, but one can easily work around 
them. Our NXP JCOP cards, for instance, only support moduli between 64 and 
244 bytes. The modulus must further have a first non-zero byte and a length (in 
bytes) th a t is divisible by 4. As a further peculiarity an exponent of 0 yields 0 
as cipher text, tha t is, x 0 =  0 when using the RSA cipher. W ith an exponent of 
1 the RSA_NOPAD cipher can be used to compute a modulus g mod n. This is, 
however, not very useful, because g cannot be longer than n  (in bytes) and for 
such numbers a simple schoolbook division achieves the same performance.
O n currently available Java cards it  is im possible to directly use the cryp to­
graphic coprocessor fo r  m ultip lica tion , m odular m ultip lica tion  or d iv ision  o f big 
in tegers.
It took us a some time to remember tha t ab =  (-a+6-) ~a . For odd mod­
uli this equation can actually be turned into a method for computing modular 
products. This method will be called squaring m ultip lica tion  in the following. For 
one modular product squaring multiplication needs to do 3 modular squares, 2 
subtractions, 1 right shift and 1 to 4 additions. The number of additions varies, 
because, for instance, (a +  b)2 mod n  might be smaller than  a2 mod n  and in 
this case ((a  +  b)2 — a2) mod n  =  ((a  +  b)2 mod n) — (a2 mod n) +  n.
On Java cards squaring multiplication gives a big speedup, because the 
squares can be computed on the cryptographic coprocessor with the help of 
the RSA cipher. For instance for numbers of 1280 bits, one square costs only 
14 milliseconds, while one addition, which must be done on the Java virtual
2 See http://www.athena-scs.com.
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machine of the card, costs 75 milliseconds. Montgomery multiplication, which 
must also run on the Java virtual machine of the card, requires 320 additions for 
numbers of 1280 bits and takes about 25 seconds. A squaring multiplication for 
such numbers costs only between 350 and 580 milliseconds.
The RSA cipher on Java Card computes only modular exponents. But if one 
chooses a modulus n  > (a +  b)2 then one can use squaring multiplication also to 
compute a normal (non-modular) product ab.
We can conclude here th a t the Java-Card API does not facilitate the imple­
mentation of advanced cryptographic protocols, because the API does not give 
access to the fast big-integer operations tha t are available on the card. W ith­
out support from the cryptographic coprocessor one is forced to implement the 
missing operations in Java using bytes and shorts (as there are usually no 32 bit 
integers on a Java card). W ith the overhead of the Java Virtual Machine added 
on top of the limited execution speed of the main processor this will almost cer­
tainly yield an unacceptable performance. As things stand, the situation is not 
likely to improve much, because the current draft of the Java-Card specification 
for upcoming Java Card 3.0 [10] does not contain any additions to the BigNum­
b er class th a t is already present in version 2.2.2. So even if some future cards 
implement the relevant optional package, one still has to implement division and 
addition in the Java Virtual Machine. W ith the trick of squaring multiplication, 
the cryptographic coprocessor can speed up multiplication and modular multi­
plication but a multiplication directly on the coprocessor would probably still 
be about 100 times faster than our squaring multiplication method.
One aim of this paper is to draw attention to the limitations of the Java 
Card API for advanced cryptographic protocols and to motivate the Java-Card 
community in general and the card producers in particular to allow access to ba­
sic cryptographic operations on the coprocessor via extensions of the Java-Card 
API. The paper illustrates the need for such extensions for the next generation 
of (privacy-friendly) sm art card applications.
3 B ignat: A  B ig-In teger library for Java Card
The limitations of the Java-Card API force us to perform some computations in 
a big-integer library on Java Card. We decided to implement such a library from 
scratch, for the following reasons. Although different big-integer libraries have 
been developed in the past in different projects [2, 3], no such library is currently 
publicly available. As [2, 3] already point out, porting an existing big-integer 
library does not make much sense because of the limitations of Java Card. The 
absence of a garbage collector, for instance, enforces a completely different Java 
programming style, in which all allocations are performed at applet initialization 
time and tem porary objects appear in the interface of those methods tha t need 
them. We further believe tha t a library interface tailored towards the application 
can improve the performance. For Brands protocols, for instance, the bases g¿ 
in a blinded attribute expression (ga1 • • • g'^k ) mod n  are constant, which makes 
special optimizations possible.
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Fig. 1: Performance of 
m ultiplication. The top 
chart compares M ont­
gomery, school-book, 
and squaring multiplica­
tion for short numbers. 
Squaring multiplication 
is fastest from about 92 
bits. The bo ttom  chart 
displays the performance 
of squaring m ultiplication 
for large numbers. One 
can clearly recognize the 
different num ber of addi­
tions th a t were necessary 
for the randomly chosen 
param eters. All m easure­
m ents were done over the 
contact interface of the 
card.
Our library implements natural numbers of arbitrary but fixed size tha t must 
be specified at object creation time. The numbers are mutable; for many opera­
tions the result is stored in the object on which the operation is invoked. If this 
object is not big enough to hold the result, an exception is thrown. The library 
implements addition, subtraction, multiplication and division with their school­
book algorithms. The Bignat library additionally implements Montgomery multi­
plication (see Appendix A) and squaring multiplication, which are both modular 
multiplications. Squaring multiplication employs the cryptographic coprocessor 
of the card via the RSA_NOPAD cipher. Figure 1 shows the performance of these 
different multiplication methods. Montgomery multiplication has a quadratic 
complexity, its computation time rises from 4.1 seconds for 512 bit numbers over 
25 seconds for 1280 bit to 64 seconds for 2048 bit numbers. As the bottom  chart in 
Figure 1 shows, squaring multiplication is much faster. However, from the RSA 
encryption performance we estimate th a t a 1280 bit multiplication performed 
directly on the cryptographic coprocessor would only take 0.3 m illiseconds.
The Bignat library contains a wrapper method for accessing the crypto­
graphic coprocessor via the RSA cipher for computing modular powers. The
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Fig. 3: Performance of 
the RSA m ethod to  com­
pute m odular multi pow­
ers. The first com puta­
tion for any base size 
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partly  outside the chart. 
For unknown reasons 
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longer over the wireless 
interface. The exponent 
length is displayed on the 
right y-axis as before.
7
wrapper works around known problems, for instance, it correctly computes 
x0 =  1. Figure 2 shows the performance of this method for computing mod­
ular powers. For the measurements the size of the exponent was chosen such 
th a t it provides similar security for Brands protocols as an RSA modulus of the 
same size as the bases. The security level of the RSA modulus is thereby esti­
m ated following Lenstra [6]. The exponents we use grow from 94 bits for bases 
of 512 bits to 198 bits for bases of 1952 bits. In Figure 2 the third line displays 
the exponent length against the right y-axis.
For modular multi-powers (g^1 • • • gfcfc ) mod n  the Bignat library contains 
two specialized methods: the R S A  m ulti-pow er m ethod  th a t uses the crypto­
graphic coprocessor as much as possible and the sim ultaneous squaring m u lti­
pow er m ethod  th a t computes the result entirely without the cryptographic co­
processor.
The RSA multi-power method computes the single modular exponents 
mod n  with the RSA cipher of the card and multiplies the results with 
squaring multiplication. Figure 3 displays the performance of this method for
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computing a multi power with 4 bases (i.e., k =  4). The subtractions and addi­
tions inside squaring multiplication are responsible for a significant part of the 
computation time. Counting subtractions as additions, the computation of one 
multi-power consists of 9-18 additions, which costs between 0.6 and 1.3 seconds 
for 1280 bit numbers.
The simultaneous squaring multi-power method uses the simultaneous squar­
ing method on the basis of Montgomery multiplication. It takes advantage of the 
fact th a t for Brands protocols the bases g  are constant and uses a precomputed 
table of all possible products of the bases gj. Therefore it only needs about 2|a| 
Montgomery multiplications, where |a| denotes the maximal size of the exponents 
a  in bits. The simultaneous squaring method requires tha t all bases and also the 
precomputed table of factors are provided in Montgomery representation. Fig­
ure 4 shows the performance of the simultaneous squaring multi-power method. 
It is clear th a t on Java Card the simultaneous squaring multi-power method has 
mostly anecdotic value. We only discuss it here for two reasons. Firstly, it pro­
vides an impression of the performance benefits of the cryptographic coprocessor 
on Java Card. Secondly, an implementation based on the simultaneous squar­
ing multi-power method can easily ported to a platform without cryptographic 
coprocessor support, such as a sm art phone.
4 Im plem ented  p rotocols and th eir  Perform ance
In this section we describe in somewhat more detail the protocols tha t we imple­
mented and show their performance on current Java cards. For reasons of space 
the precise technical description of the protocols has been moved to  Appendix B.
We actually implemented two applets, the coprocessor-enabled applet and the 
pure Java-C ard applet. The same host driver is used to control both applets. The 
coprocessor-enabled applet uses internally the RSA multi-power method while 
the pure Java-Card applet uses the simultaneous squaring multi-power method. 
The pure Java-Card applet is only shown here for the comparison.
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Both applets are functionally equivalent. They hold k attributes a i , . . .  , a k 
th a t could encode the card type (e.g., whether it is a month card or a reduc­
tion card), the expiration date, possibly a balance, and so on. One of the at­
tributes is the private key of the applet, which will never be disclosed to any­
body. From the attributes the applet computes its blinded attribute expression 
A =  bv g a  • • • g <ak mod n, where the bases gj, the RSA modulus n  and the public 
RSA exponent v are public system parameters. The b is a blinding factor tha t is 
private to the applet and tha t ensures th a t the attribute expression A  does not 
function as a pseudonym. To ensure th a t the attributes are original the whole 
attribute expression A is signed. The signature is constructed in such a way that 
the signing authority does not see the resulting signature and therefore cannot 
use the signature to recognize the applet later.
In our implementation one can configure the number of attributes k  and 
the size of the RSA modulus n  and the size of the public RSA exponent v 
at initialization time. A modulus of 1280 bits and an exponent of 160 bits are 
sufficient to ensure security over the next few years. Together the host driver and 
each of the applets implement the following protocols (for a complete technical 
description of the protocols see Appendix B):
K ey  S e tu p  a n d  In it ia l iz a tio n  The host driver generate the keys, the bases 
g i , . . . ,  gk and chooses the first attributes a i , . . . ,  a k of the applet. The key 
material, the bases and the attributes are installed in the applet and the 
applet computes its first attribute expression A. As last part of the initial­
ization the resign protocol is run to let the applet change its blinding b and 
to equip it with a valid signature.
R esig n  P ro to c o l The applet shows its blinded attribute expression A and the 
signature and the host driver checks the validity of the signature (this check 
is of course left out if resigning runs as part of the initialization). The host 
driver can then change selected attributes (for instance to change the ex­
piration date) and the applet chooses a new blinding b. Finally the applet 
obtains a new signature for the changed blinded attribute expression.
G a te  P ro to c o l The applet shows its blinded attribute expression A and the 
signature, which is checked by the host as in the resign protocol. The applet 
then proves with a zero-knowledge proof tha t it knows suitable attributes 
ai , . . . , ak tha t give rise to A. Thereby the host learns nothing about the 
attributes.
A feature currently missing is the partial disclosure of some attributes. For in­
stance, at the gate the card would disclose its card type and claim tha t the 
expiration date lays in the future.
Figure 5 shows the transaction times for the complete system, using either 
the coprocessor enabled or the pure Java-Card applet. For 4 attributes and a 
RSA key size of 1280 bits and a public RSA exponent of 160 bits the resign 
protocol takes between 10 and 11 seconds and the gate protocol between 8 and 
9 seconds (the lines in Figure 5 show the average of a number of measurements). 
For 2 attributes resigning takes between 8 and 9 seconds and the gate proto­
col between 5.2 and 5.8 seconds. The applet is therefore probably too slow for
10 Hendrik Tews and B art Jacobs
Coprocessor enabled applet
RSA key size in bits 
Pure Java-Card applet (4 attributes)
RSA key size in bits
Fig. 5: Performance of 
the two applets. Note 
th a t y-axis of the top 
chart is in seconds, while 
for the bottom  chart it 
is in minutes. Timings 
are complete transac­
tion times over the wired 
interface, th a t is, includ­
ing the com putation of 
the host driver, the com­
m unication time, and, 
of course, the com puta­
tion of the applet. The 
coprocessor enabled ap­
plet only supports key 
sizes between 64 and 244 
bytes, because the RSA 
cipher on our cards only 
supports these key sizes. 
The measurem ent for the 
pure Java-Card applet 
has been stopped after 
the key size 512.
public transport and most other applications. However, the performance of the 
coprocessor enabled applet shows tha t with proper support from a cryptographic 
coprocessor Brands protocols could already be used today on Java cards. W ith 
an appropriate API for the coprocessor we estimate tha t transaction times of 
about 1 second are possible for currently available Java cards.
5 V ariants based on E llip tic  curves
Brands protocols for selective disclosure and blinded issuing do also exist in 
a discrete log (DL) variant. This variant can be implemented on the basis of 
elliptic curves [12]. The main advantage of elliptic curves is th a t they permit 
much smaller key sizes—keys of 150-200 bit would be sufficient. Therefore the 
numbers tha t one has to manipulate for the DL variant are much smaller: 150­
200 bits instead of 1200-2000 bits as for the RSA variants. The disadvantage 
is th a t the base operation on elliptic curves —addition of two points— is much 
more involved.
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Although many Java cards implement cryptographic protocols based on el­
liptic curves, there is no support for adding points of an elliptic curve in the 
Java-Card API. There are two high-level elliptic curve related methods in the 
Java-Card API: ECDSA, the digital signature algorithm over elliptic curves and 
ECDH, Diffie-Hellman key agreement over elliptic curves. ECDSA specifies some 
random padding, so it cannot be used to perform addition or scalar multiplica­
tion of points. It should be possible to trick the Diffie-Hellman algorithm into 
performing a scalar multiplication of an elliptic-curve point. However, a point of 
an elliptic curve has two coordinates and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement on 
Java Card only returns the x-coordinate. This could suffice for those protocols 
th a t just do one scalar multiplication at the end, because then the missing y- 
coordinate can be reconstructed on the host. For Brands protocols, however, one 
would have to reconstruct the missing y-coordinate on the card. As this involves 
a square root we are very sceptical about the performance benefits of exploiting 
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
We have not done any experiments yet, but we expect tha t Brands DL vari­
ants would actually be slower than our coprocessor enabled applet. We expect 
th a t the disadvantage of the missing coprocessor support outweighs the advan­
tage of shorter keys.
6 C onclusion
In this paper we evaluated the performance of Brands selective disclosure and 
blinded issuing protocols on currently publicly available Java cards. The per­
formance is not sufficient for most applications. A zero-knowledge proof for 4 
attributes takes about 9 seconds, while blinded issuing takes about 10 seconds 
for an RSA key size of 1280 bits. For two attributes the zero-knowledge proof 
takes about 5 seconds for the same RSA key size. Limitations in the Java-Card 
API for accessing the cryptographic coprocessor are solely responsible for the 
bad performance. While we found a way to compute modular powers g a mod n 
on the coprocessor by abusing RSA public key encryption, there is no direct way 
to  execute a modular big-integer multiplication on the coprocessor. Montgomery 
multiplication executed on the Java Card Virtual machine takes 25 seconds for 
1280 bit numbers. The familiar equation (a +  b)2 =  a2 +  2ab +  b2 can be used 
to  dramatically speed up the computation of a modular product because the 
squares can be computed on the cryptographic coprocessor. W ith this trick one 
modular multiplication takes between 0.3 and 0.6 seconds for numbers of 1280 
bits. In contrast, we estimate th a t a modular multiplication directly on the cryp­
tographic coprocessor would only take about 0.3 m illiseconds  for numbers of this 
size.
We believe that, with appropriate support in the API, running times in the 
order of 1 second are possible.
To facilitate the development and use of new cryptographic protocols the 
Java-Card API should as soon as possible be enriched with at least two optional 
classes. One for the basic big-integer operations tha t are missing from ja v a -
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cards.fram ew ork.m ath.BigNum ber: modular multiplication, modular addition, 
division, modulus, modular powers, and modular inverse. The second class should 
contain addition and scalar multiplication of points on elliptic curves. Note that 
all these operations are already implemented on most cards, so it is only a 
question of exporting them to the Java-Card API.
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A p p en d ix  A  M ontgom ery M ultip lication
This appendix briefly describes Montgomery multiplication as used in our im­
plementation, see [7, Algorithm 14.36] for a more general description. For clarity 
we use — • — to denote standard multiplication.
be the number of bytes it occupies.Let n  be an odd modulus and l M8
The M ontgom ery  fa c to r  R  w ith  respect to n  is then defined as R  =  281 mod n. 
Its modular inverse with respect to n  is denoted with R -1 , so (R • R -1 ) mod 
n  = 1 .  The M ontgom ery represen ta tion  of a number x is (x • R )  mod n, where 
n  is clear from the context. M ontgom ery m ultip lication, denoted with — x —, 
is defined as follows: x x y  =  (x • y  • R - 1 ) mod n. If the arguments are in 
Montgomery representation then so is the result: (x • R) x (y • R) =  (x • y) • 
R mod n. To compute the modular product of a fixed number of factors it is 
not necessary to convert all factors into Montgomery representation. Instead one 
adds an additional correction factor R k, where k is the number of factors. For 
instance (a1 • a2 • a3) mod n  =  a 1 x a2 x a3 x R3. To convert a number from 
Montgomery representation back to normal one multiplies with R -1 or exploits 
x =  (x • R) x 1.
Montgomery multiplication can be computed with a modified schoolbook 
multiplication algorithm. To compute x x y one decomposes y into l byte-digits 
y iy i-1  • • • y1yo and performs precisely l multiplication rounds. In multiplication 
round i one adds x • y¿ to  the accumulator and shifts the accumulator one byte 
to  the right. Before shifting one makes the last digit of the accumulator equal 
to  0 by adding a suitable multiple of n. For an odd modulus n  such a suitable 
multiple does always exist. Which multiple of n  to use can be deduced from the 
last byte of the accumulator. The final accumulator might be bigger than  n, so 
one has to  take the modulus with respect to n  at the end. The accumulator must 
be capable of holding l bytes plus 9 bits. In our implementation all numbers that 
come in contact with Montgomery multiplication are simply allocated with l +  2 
bytes.
A p p en d ix  B  D escrip tion  o f th e  Im plem ented  P rotoco ls
This appendix describes the protocols from [1] tha t we implemented. The tech­
nical description is for the coprocessor enabled applet. The changes for the pure 
Java-Card applet are summarized at the end of each subsection.
B .1  In it ia liz a tio n  a n d  P e rso n a liz a tio n
P a ra m e te r  s e tu p  Before starting the following points must be configured.
— The number k of attributes each applet possesses.
— The size of the RSA modulus n  in bits, denoted with |n| in the sequal.
— Optionally the size of the public RSA exponent v, denoted with |v| in the 
following. If not configured, |v| is derived from |n| using Lenstras estimations 
on the security level of RSA keys [6].
14 Hendrik Tews and B art Jacobs
The following system parameters are computed once. If not further determined 
the items are randomly chosen to satisfy the relevant conditions.
— The RSA modulus n  of size |n|, where n  =  p q with p and q prime.
— The public RSA exponent v of size |v|, such tha t v is prime and coprime to 
p(n) =  (p — 1)(q — 1), where p  is Euler’s totient function.
— The modular inverse of v with respect to p(n), denoted with v-1 in the 
following.
— The private system key x G H fn (i.e., gcd(x, n) =  1) and the public system 
key h =  x v mod n.
— k bases g1, .. ., gk G Zn
— For the pure Java-Card applet, the Montgomery factor R with respect to n 
(see Appendix A).
For each applet tha t gets initialized one generates k random attribute values 
a1, .. ., ak G Zv.
A p p le t in itia liz a tio n  After the coprocessor enabled applet or the pure Java­
Card applet has been installed on a Java card the following protocol initializes 
the applet. In the protocol description A denotes the applet and H  the host
| v| , | n| , k
the applet allocates all data structures 
n, h, g1 , . . .gk, b, ffg, a 1 , .. ., ak, v, R
where b =  1 is the initial blinding of the card, 
n g, the precomputed products of the bases g¿, and R 
are only used on the pure Java-Card applet.
The card computes its blinded attribute expression A =  bv g“¿
subsequently the resign protocol is run, whereby the attribute updates 
are 0 and the signature check is left out on the host
For the pure Java-Card applet there are the following changes. In the second 
step the values of h, g1, . . . , g k and b are transformed into their Montgomery 
representation on the host before sending. The precomputed products n g is an 
array of 2k — 1 elements containing the Montgomery representation of all possible 
products of the bases g¿, except for the empty product 1. On the coprocessor 
enabled applet n g is an array with one arbitrary element, because the Java-Card 
protocol layer does not support empty arrays. The Montgomery factor R, which 
equals the Montgomery representation of 1, is needed on the pure Java-Card 
applet to initialize the accumulator for the simultaneous squaring multi-power 
method.
driver.
H  — ► A :
H  — ► A :
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B .2 R esig n  p ro to c o l
The resign protocol is taken from [1, Section 4.2.2.]. When the resign protocol 
runs as part of the applet initialization the signature (Sc, Sr ) is not yet initialized 
and therefore not checked in the first step.
A
H
A
H
A
H
A
H
A
app le t-id , A , S c, S r , where
{
3 for the pure Java-Card applet 
4 for the coprocessor enabled applet
The host checks the signature Sc =  H (A , S^ (hA)-Sc) 
and aborts the protocol if the equation does not hold. 
a , U1 , . . . ,  Uk,
where a  G Zn is the host commitment, and 
U  are the encoded attribute updates for 
arbitrary attribute updates m1, . . . ,  u k such that
— v < Uj < v and Mj
v +  Uj 
Uj
for Uj < 0 
otherwise
the applet computes its new attributes aj =  (aj +  Uj) mod v 
and the updated attribute expression A1 =  bv ga  
c =  (SC +  ß3) mod v, where 
SC =  H  (A", a ß 2v (hA ')ß3)
A11 =  ß v A1
and ß 1, ß2 G Zn, ß3 G Zv are random 
the applet additionally computes
q =  (SC +  ß3) ^  v (where ^  denotes integer division) 
b1 =  ß 1b mod n
(a(hA h)C
H  : acc, where acc
)(v ), where Ah =  A J J g “
f true if r v =  a (h A ')C 
fa ls e  if r v =  a (h A ')C
i S' iif acc =  true  the applet computes Sr =  rß 2ß 1 c (hA )q 
and atomically switches to use aj, b1, A11, SC and Sr 
instead of aj , b, A, Sc and Sr
In the preceding protocol H  is a one-way hash function and ^  denotes integer 
division with the property b (a ^  b) +  (a mod b) =  a for arbitrary a, b G N. Our 
implementation uses 160 bit SHA-1 for H .
The host does not have access to the attribute values and must therefore 
compute its updated attribute expression Ah in a different way. Both A1 and Ah
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must be equal, otherwise the protocol fails. Note tha t the attribute updates Uj 
might be negative, so it might be necessary to compute modular inverses (with 
respect to n) in the computation of Ah.
The protocol will also fail if one of the attribute updates yields an under 
or an overflow, tha t is if a j +  Uj < 0 or if aj +  Uj > v. Therefore, the host 
can only update those attributes where it knows something about the value. In 
our implementation this problem is solved with an additional status protocol, 
in which the applet sends all its data, including attributes and blinding, to the 
host. In a real application such a status protocol must, of course, not exist.
For the pure Java-Card applet the protocol is identical, except tha t A, Sr , a  
and r  are transm itted in their Montgomery representation and the arguments 
of the hash H  are also in Montgomery representation (always with respect to 
modulus n).
B .3  G a te  P ro to c o l
The gate protocol is taken from [1, Section 2.4.4.].
A
H
A
H
A
H
app le t-id , A , S c, S r , w , where the applet-id  is as before, and 
w =  ß v g“¿ is the applet’s witness
with ß  G Zn, a 1, . . . ,  a k G Zv randomly chosen by the applet
the host checks the signature Sc =  H (A , S^ (hA)-Sc) 
and aborts the protocol if the equation does not hold 
Y G Zv, the random challenge 
the applet checks tha t indeed y < v
r 1, . . .  r k, s, where
rj =  (Yaj +  aj) mod v 
qj =  (Yaj +  aj) ^  v
s =  ßb7 n  g f
the host accepts the proof if sv g[¿
For the pure Java-Card applet the protocol is identical, except tha t A, Sr , w and 
s are transm itted in Montgomery representation and the arguments of H  are 
also in Montgomery representation.
